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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-New Mexico Requires
Exigent Circumstances for Warrantless Public Arrests:
Campos v. State
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Campos v. State,' the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed for
the first time whether warrantless public arrests require exigent circumstances in order to be constitutional in New Mexico. 2 The court held
that a warrantless public arrest must be based upon both probable cause
and sufficient exigent circumstances., In requiring exigent circumstances
for warrantless public arrests to be constitutional, the New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution to extend more protection from unreasonable searches and arrests
than its federal analog, the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.' This Note will provide an overview of the Fourth Amendment, examine New Mexico law on searches and seizures, analyze the
rationale of the Campos court, and explore the ramifications of the
decision.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 7, 1989, an informant alerted Officer Luis Lara that
Frank Martin Campos would be conducting a drug transaction the following morning in Roswell. The informant described two cars, either
of which Campos might be driving, and where the transaction would
take place. Officer Lara then set up a surveillance team in the area the
informant described. Lara knew Campos used vehicles like those described
by the informant because he had been investigating Campos for suspected
drug activity for approximately one year before receiving the informant's
tip. On the following morning, a member of the surveillance team observed
Campos driving one of the cars the informant had described in the area
the informant had indicated. The officers stopped Campos, ordered him

1. 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994).
2. Id. at 158, 870 P.2d at 120.
3. Id. at 156, 870 P.2d at 118. Exigent circumstances are those emergencies requiring swift
action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent
escape of a suspect or the destruction of evidence. State v. Copeland, 105 N.M. 27, 31, 727 P.2d
1342, 1346 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104 N.M. 702, 726 P.2d 856 (1986).
4. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (holding that a state decision is subject to
review by a federal court unless the state court clearly relied on state law). The Campos court
declined to adopt the blanket federal rule that all warrantless arrests of felons in public places that
are based on probable cause are constitutionally permissible. Campos, 117 N.M. at 158, 870 P.2d
at 120. See also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976). The Watson Court held that
warrantless public arrests did not require exigent circumstances and stated that it would not transform
a "judicial preference" for arrest warrants into a constitutional rule for fear of creating endless
litigation over the existence of exigent circumstances. Id.
5. The facts in this opinion are set out in Campos, 117 N.M. at 156-57, 870 P.2d at 118-19.
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out of his car, and arrested him without either an arrest or search
warrant. The officers then searched Campos and his car, finding seven6
packages of heroin. Campos was convicted of illegal possession of heroin.
Prior to trial, Campos moved to suppress all evidence seized pursuant
to the warrantless arrest and search. 7 The trial court denied the motion,
and Campos appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision. 8 The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. 9
III.

HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

A.

Federal Law
Federal law defining the circumstances under which people may be
searched and arrested has developed from the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment guarantees every
individual the right to be free from unreasonable government searches
and seizures. 10 The Fourth Amendment is enforced through the exclusionary rule, which provides that evidence seized as a result of an illegal
search or seizure is inadmissible at trial."
1. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment is composed of two clauses: the Reasonableness
Clause, which guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Warrant Clause, which specifies the form and content of
warrants and sets forth the conditions necessary for issuing warrants.' 2
As a result, two interpretations of the Fourth Amendment have emerged:
the rational basis model and the warrant preference rule. 3 The rational
basis model provides "that the clauses of the amendment are independent
declarations."1 4 Read in this way, the Fourth Amendment does not always
require a judicial warrant for searches and seizures to be reasonable. 5

6. Id. at 156, 870 P.2d at 118.
7. The procedure of the lower court is set out in Campos, 117 N.M. at 157, 870 P.2d at 119.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 159, 870 P.2d at 122.
10. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
11. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. Id.
13. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 197, 202-07 (1993). Maclin points out that during the twentieth century a debate has grown
regarding the relationship between the two clauses. The warrant preference rule grew in popularity
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but consensus for this rule never existed among the justices.
Justice White and Justice Rehnquist challenged the warrant preference rule, and in the 1990s the
rational basis model became the constitutional test for judging government intrusions. Id. at 20407 and nn.27-32.
14. Id. at 202.
15. Id. (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947)).
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If a court adheres strictly to the rational basis model, it will most likely
not presume that warrants are necessary for a valid search or arrest. If
a court follows the warrant preference rule, which maintains that "the
Warrant Clause modifies the first clause," the clauses operate together.

Consequently, the court will presume that, absent a compelling reason,
a warrant is a necessary prerequisite to a valid search or seizure because
6
a warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable.
By requiring exigent circumstances for warrantless public arrests, the
New Mexico Supreme Court followed the warrant preference rule, affirming its adherence to the warrant requirement. 7

2.

Federal Case Law

In United States v. Rabinowitz, the United States Supreme Court stated
the basic principle of the rational basis model. 8 In the same case, Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion asserted the principle of the warrant

preference rule. 19
Similarly, the opinion and dissent in United States v. Watson20 illustrate
the two divergent interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. 2' In, Watson,
the defendant was convicted of possessing stolen mail in the form of
credit cards. 22 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds
that the arrest was unconstitutional because the postal inspector failed
to obtain an arrest warrant, although he had time to do S0.23 The United
States Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. 24 Justice White, writing
for the majority, held that warrantless public arrests could be based on
probable cause alone25 and did not require the existence of exigent circumstances, which he claimed would lead to endless litigation. 26 The
Court reasoned that, under the common law, warrantless arrests for
felonies did not require exigent circumstances and could be made based

16. Harris, 331 U.S. at 162 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[W]ith minor and severely confined
exceptions ... every search and seizure is unreasonable when made without a magistrate's authority
expressed through a validly issued warrant.").
17. See Campos, 117 N.M. at 159, 870 P.2d at 121 (stating that principles of warrant requirement
are firmly rooted in the New Mexico Constitution) (citing State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 216,
784 P.2d 30, 35 (1989)).
18. 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950) ("[T]he Constitution does not say that the right of the people to
be secure in their persons should not be violated without a search warrant if it is practicable for
the officers to procure one. The mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that people shall be secure
against unreasonable searches.").
19. Id. at 83 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("What is the test of reason which makes a search
reasonable? . . . There must be a warrant to permit search, barring only inherent limitations upon
that requirement when there is a good excuse for not getting a warrant ....
.
20. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
21. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
22. 423 U.S. at 414.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 425.
25. Probable cause exists if an officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a felony, or has committed a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor in the
officer's presence. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422 (1976).
26. Id. at 423-24.
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only upon probable cause. 2 The Court further noted that the warrantless
arrest in question was2 statutorily authorized and was, therefore, presumptively reasonable. 1
In his dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the majority's reasoning,
arguing that "a felony at common law and a felony today bear only
,,29 Marshall asserted that even though a preslight resemblance ....
sumption of reasonableness exists for Acts of Congress, the Court's
"obligation is to the Constitution, not the Congress." 30 Justice Marshall
argued that the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment should be read
together because, with some exceptions, a search of private property
without consent is unreasonable unless authorized by a valid search
warrant. 3 Justice Marshall concluded that, as a result of the holding of
Watson, "the preference for an arrest warrant, which the Court has
conceded is the optimal method to protect our citizens from the affront
only an ideal, one that the Court will
of an unlawful arrest, will'3 remain
2
espouse but not enforce."
In 1980, however, the United States Supreme Court carved out an
exception to Watson's holding that warrantless public arrests could be
based on probable cause alone.33 In Payton v. New York, the court held
that both probable cause and exigent circumstances are required for a
warrantless arrest made in a person's home. 3 4 This distinction was based
on the premise that people in their homes have a legitimate expectation
of privacy, but people in public places do not." Writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens stated that the zone of privacy the Fourth Amendment
protects is nowhere "more clearly defined than when bounded by the
[Tihe
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home ....
36
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house."

27. Id. at 418.
28. Id. at 415-16. The Court stated that 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) authorized employees "performing
duties related to the inspection of postal matters" to "make arrests without warrant for felonies
cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed or is committing such a felony." Id. at 415 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§3061(a)(3)).

29. Id. at 438.
30. Id. at 443.
31. Id. at 444 (stating that warrantless searches without consent are presumptively unreasonable)
(citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967)).
32. Id. at 456. Justice Marshall commented that there would now be only two incentives for
police officers to seek warrants at all: 1) a suggestion by the Court that a stronger showing of
probable cause may be necessary for a warrantless arrest than if a warrant had been obtained and
2) the desire of a police officer to have a magistrate's sanction of probable cause. Id. at 456, n.22.
He also noted that the holding of Watson was not warranted by the facts of the case because
"Watson's warrantless arrest was valid under the recognized exigent-circumstances exception." Id.
at 435.
33. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. at 423 (holding that warrantless arrests in public
places did not require exigent circumstances).
34. 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980).
35. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment applies in situations where a person has an actual and reasonable expectation
of privacy).
36. Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90.
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In order to protect this zone of privacy, the Court required exigent
circumstances for warrantless arrests in an individual's dwelling." Despite
Payton's exception to the warrantless arrest rule, Watson's ruling that
exigent circumstances are unnecessary for warrantless public arrests underscores the view that the Court has "relegated [the Fourth Amendment]
to a deferred position.""a
B.

Other Jurisdictions
Following the ruling in Watson, other jurisdictions require only probable
cause for warrantless public arrests.3 9 Those same jurisdictions also recognize the distinction between warrantless public and private arrests and
follow Payton v. New York, which requires exigent circumstances for
warrantless arrests in an individual's dwelling. 40 This public-private distinction, however, has not proven to be a very helpful guide, and the
courts have split on this issue.
In Kansas v. Riddle,41 police officers were given the name, of the
defendant by the victim, who claimed the defendant had abducted and
sexually attacked her. 42 One of the victim's friends gave the police the
defendant's address, and the police went to his house without an arrest
warrant. 43 The police officers met the defendant at the door of his house,
asked him to step outside, and then arrested him. The court held that
this was a valid arrest because the police officers had probable cause
and arrested the defendant in a public place-outside his house. 4
Massachusetts, in contrast, has suggested that when a defendant has
been lured out of a dwelling to be arrested, that arrest may be invalid
because "[a]rguably ... the use of . . [a] ruse constitutes a kind of
verbal 'entry' by the police that implicates the same privacy interests
protected by the holding in Payton.' ' 4 5
Further confusion arises when defendants are arrested in their doorways.
In New York v. Min Chul Shin, the New York Supreme Court ruled
that doorway arrests require only probable cause because doorways are
public places." In contrast, New Hampshire v. Morse held that the

37. Id. at 583.
38. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also Maclin,
supra note 13, at 238 (stating that the Fourth Amendment, unlike other provisions in the Bill of
Rights, has become "a second-class right" because the Court sees "the typical Fourth Amendment
claimant as a second-class citizen, and sees the typical police officer as being overwhelmed with
the responsibilities and duties of maintaining law and order in our crime-prone society.").
39. See, e.g., Georgia v. McBride, 401 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Ga. 1991) (requiring only probable
cause for a warrantless public arrest); Utah v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1987) (requiring
probable cause for a warrantless public arrest); Washington v. Herzog, 867 P.2d 648, 658 (Wash.
1994) (holding that a warrantless arrest in a public place must be supported by probable cause).
40. 445 U.S. 573.
41. 788 P.2d 266 (Kan. 1990).
42. Id. at 267.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 270.
45. Massachusetts v. Bradshaw, 431 N.E.2d 880, 887 (Mass. 1982).
46. 607 N.Y.S.2d 369 (N.Y. App. Div.).
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warrantless arrest of a defendant when he appeared at the doorway of
his motel room was47invalid absent exigent circumstances because doorways
are private places.
Apart from the confusion about where to draw the line between a
public and a private place, confusion exists about exactly what constitutes
a private place. In Florida v. Perry, for example, an undercover agent48
negotiated with the defendant to buy marijuana in the defendant's home.
Once inside the house, the agent signalled to other officers who entered
the house and arrested the defendant without a warrant. The court held
that because the residence was being used for the transaction of unlawful
business, it had become a public place, and the defendant's right to
privacy was waived. 49 Likewise, in Patterson v. Kentucky, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals ruled that a warrantless arrest was valid when the
defendant was arrested while talking on the telephone in the apartment
of his downstairs neighbor.50 These rulings suggest that the zone of privacy
the Supreme Court defined in Payton is not clear.
C. New Mexico Law
Constitutional Analysis of the Search and Seizure Provision of
the New Mexico Constitution
In a recent series of cases, the New Mexico Supreme Court has shown
its willingness to interpret the search and seizure provision of the New
Mexico Constitution 5 differently from the way in which the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment, although the
search and seizure provisions are almost identical. 2 In requiring more
structure in the way "reasonableness" is determined for warrantless searches
and arrests, New Mexico law affords more protection to its citizens than
does the Fourth Amendment.5 3
1.

Cordova, Gutierrez, and Attaway: New Mexico Case Law
Supports a High Standard of Protection Against Unreasonable
Searches and Arrests
In 1989, in State v. Cordova,5 4 the New Mexico Supreme Court marked
its first departure from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by
a.

480 A.2d 183, 186 (N.H. 1984).
398 So. 2d 959, 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 961.
630 S.W.2d 73, 74-75 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
Article 11, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant shall issue without describing
the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized nor without a written
showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
N.M. CoNsr. art. II, § 10.
52. See, e.g., State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103 (1994); State v. Gutierrez, 116
N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993); State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989). See also
notes 10 and 51, supra, for comparison.
53. Id.
54. 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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refusing to apply the Gates test, which eroded the standard of probable
cause under the Fourth Amendment. 5 Instead, the Cordova court continued to apply the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test,5 6 formally adopting
it as the standard by which to determine probable cause. 7
The two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test requires that when an application
for a search warrant is based on an affidavit, the affidavit must contain
sufficient facts to enable the magistrate to make an independent determination of probable cause.5 8 In order to make this determination, the
magistrate must determine both the credibility of the informant and the
reliability of the informant's information. 9 In Gates, however, the United
States Supreme Court stated that the two prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli
test would not be determinative of probable cause, but merely factors
to consider. 6° The Court stated that some lower courts were applying the
two-prong test in a rigid and technical manner and so adopted a "totality
of the circumstances" test, 61 which it reasoned was more consistent with
the fluid concept of probable cause. 62
In Cordova, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the search
warrant rule requires a warrant affidavit to meet a two-prong test, setting
forth 1) a substantial basis for believing the informant, and 2) a substantial
basis for concluding the informant gathered the information of illegal
activity in a reliable fashion. 63 In refusing to adopt the "totality of the
circumstances" test, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that the twoprong test has not proven too rigid in New Mexico courts. Instead, the
Cordova court found that the two-prong test provides "structure for the
inquiry into whether probable cause has been demonstrated." 64 By taking
this position, the court provided a higher and more objective standard
for probable cause than federal law requires under Gates.
In a recent case, State v. Gutierrez,65 the New Mexico Supreme Court
declared "a willingness to undertake independent analysis of our state
55. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (holding that the two prongs of the AguilarSpinelli test would no longer be determinative of probable cause, but only factors to consider).
56. The two-prong test was developed in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and in Spinelli
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
57. See Cordova, 109 N.M. at 217, 784 P.2d at 36.
58. Id. at 213, 784 P.2d at 32.
59. Id. (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 114).
60. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31.
61. The Court stated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
62. Id. at 230-31.
63. 109 N.M. at 214, 784 P.2d at 33. The court also noted that in referring to reliability, the
Aguilar court meant that "the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances
from which the informant concluded that [the facts were as] he claimed they were, and some of
the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant . . . was 'credible'
or his informant 'reliable."' Id. at 111, 784 P.2d at 32 (citing Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114).
64. Id. at 216, 784 P.2d at 35.
65. 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993).
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constitutional guarantees when federal law begins to encroach on the
sanctity of those guarantees. ' 66 In Gutierrez, the defendants were charged
with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, conspiracy to commit possession of controlled substance with intent to
distribute, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 67 The defendants moved
to suppress the evidence recovered from their apartment during the search,
based on an invalid warrant and was,
asserting that the search was
68
therefore, unconstitutional.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, 69 the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that a "good faith" exception to the federal exclusionary
rule is incompatible with the constitutional protections found under Article
II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.70 The "good faith" rule
provides that the exclusion of evidence is not necessary when an officer
71
relies in good faith on a warrant that is later invalidated. The court
reasoned that under the New Mexico Constitution, the only way the court
can effectuate the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure is to deny the government the use of evidence obtained
pursuant to an unlawful search. 72 Consequently, the court held that the
73
good-faith exception is incompatible with the exclusionary rule. Once
again, the court appeared to be seeking a more objective standard with
which to interpret the Fourth Amendment.
Recently, in State v. Attaway, 74 the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that in the execution of a search warrant, officers must comply with the
76
announcement rule 75 unless exigent circumstances are present. In that
case, the defendant appealed from a conviction of distributing a controlled
the
substance, arguing that the police officers failed to comply with
77
knock-and-announce rule, rendering the search unconstitutional.
The court reasoned that the knock-and-announce rule is a constitutional
requirement because it objectively determines what is reasonable under
Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. 78 In requiring

66. Id. at 440, 863 P.2d at 1061.
67. Id. at 432, 863 P.2d at 1054.
68. Id.
69. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (adopting a "good-faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule).
70. State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M 431, 447, 863 P.2d 1052, 1068 (1993).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 445, 863 P.2d at 1066.
73. Id. at 447, 863 P.2d at 1068.
74. 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103 (1994).
75. Attaway reports that the common-law rule of announcement was first articulated in Semayne'
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1603):
In all cases when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may
break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the
K[ing]'s process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought
to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors . . . . Id.
at 195 (footnotes omitted).
Attaway, 117 N.M. at 146, 870 P.2d at 108.
76. Id. at 150, 870 P.2d at 112.
77. Id. at 143-44, 870 P.2d at 105-06.
78. Id.at 149-51, 870 P.2d at 111-13.
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some objective clarification of reasonableness, the New Mexico Supreme
Court supported Justice Frankfurter's view that the Warrant Clause is
an objective clarification of the Reasonableness Clause. 79
These decisions reveal the New Mexico Supreme Court's desire to
interpret the search and seizure provision of the New Mexico Constitution
to provide more protection than the Fourth Amendment. By requiring
objective tests for reasonableness rather than a "totality of the circumstances" standard, New Mexico has gone beyond federal standards in
order to protect its citizens from unreasonable searches and arrests. It
is in this context that the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Campos.
2. Case Law Requirements for Warrantless Public Arrests
The issue considered in Campos v. State-whether New Mexico requires
exigent circumstances in addition to probable cause for warrantless public
arrests-was one of first impression. 0 The court of appeals followed the
holding of United States v. Watson and held that only probable cause
was necessary for a warrantless public arrest. 8 The supreme court reversed
the appellate decision, holding that although most New Mexico cases
expressly require only that warrantless arrests must be supported by
probable cause, "some evidence of exigency [in those cases] has been
found or could be implied to support the warrantless arrest. '82
In 1966, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld a warrantless arrest
and search in which there were exigent circumstances. 83 In State v.
Delentre, a void search warrant had been issued to the police officer. 84
As the officer approached the defendant's apartment, he was informed
that the defendant was rolling marijuana into cigarettes inside his apartment. 85 When the officer announced his presence, he heard sounds of
running from inside the apartment. 86 Although the Delentre court did
not directly address the issue of whether exigent circumstances existed,
the facts implied such circumstances. The probability that evidence would
be destroyed before a warrant could be obtained constitutes exigent
circumstances.
Similarly, in State v. Kaiser, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held
that a warrantless arrest of a defendant in a railroad Pullman car was
valid. 87 The fact that the train was about to leave satisfied the exigency
requirement because the suspect's flight was imminent. In Rodriquez v.

79. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 83 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
80. 117 N.M. at 158, 870 P.2d at 120.
81. 113 N.M. 421, 427, 827 P.2d 136, 142 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd by Campos v. State, 117
N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994).
82. Campos, 117 N.M. at 159, 870 P.2d at 121. The court also noted that at least one New
Mexico case has held that both probable cause and exigent circumstances are required for a warrantless
*arrest. See State v. Martinez, 94 N.M. 436, 440, 612 P.2d 228, 232, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 959
(1980).
83. See State v. Delentre, 77 N.M. 497, 424 P.2d 782 (1966).
84. Id. at 499, 424 P.2d at 783.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 500, 424 P.2d at 784.
87. 91 N.M. 611, 613, 577 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 576 P.2d 297 (1978).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

State, officers were called to a house in which they had been informed
the occupants were discussing taking drugs.8" As the officers approached
the house, they became aware that there were several individuals with a
rifle inside the house.8 9 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that "the
circumstances . . . allowed the officers to lawfully enter upon the defendant's property in order to inquire as to the welfare" of one of the
occupants. 90 The presence of the rifle provided the exigency necessary
for the warrantless entry.
Finally, in State v. Martinez,91 a patrolling officer received a radio
dispatch to be on the lookout for a vehicle that had just been involved
in a robbery. 92 Shortly after receiving the dispatch, the officer spotted
the vehicle and arrested the suspects. 93 In holding that the arrest was
valid, the court stated that "the radio dispatch upon which a warrantless
arrest or search is basqd must contain as high a standard showing probable
cause and reliability as that required to support a warrant, in addition
to exigent circumstances which would justify proceeding without a

warrant.

94

Without explicitly saying so, New Mexico courts have relied on the
presence of exigent circumstances before upholding warrantless public
arrests. As Chief Justice Ransom noted in Campos v. State, in all these
cases, "some evidence of exigency has been found or could be implied
to support the warrantless arrest." 95
IV.

RATIONALE OF THE CAMPOS COURT

a
In reaching its decision, the Campos court first considered whether %
warrantless arrest was consistent with the Controlled Substances Act.
Under this act, officers can make warrantless arrests for offenses committed in their presence, or when they have probable cause to believe
97
that a crime violating the act is or has been committed. The court
concluded that there was statutory authority for the warrantless arrest
because the officers had probable cause to believe that Campos was in
possession of a controlled substance. 9

88. 91 N.M. 700, 701, 580 P.2d 126, 127 (1978), overruled on other grounds, State v. Martinez,
94 N.M. 436, 439, 612 P.2d 228, 231 (1980).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 129, 580 P.2d at 703.
91. 94 N.M. 436, 612 P.2d 228 (1980).
92. Id. at 437, 612 P.2d at 229.
93. Id.at 437-38, 612 P.2d at 229-30.
94. Id.at 440, 612 P.2d at 232 (emphasis added).
95. 117 N.M. at 159, 870 P.2d at 121.
96. New Mexico statutory law authorizes an officer to: "make arrests without warrant for any
offense under the Controlled Substances Act committed in his presence, or if he has probable cause
to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a violation of the Controlled
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-31-1 to -41 (Repl.
Substances Act which may constitute a felony .
Pamp. 1989).
97. Id.
98. Campos, 117 N.M. at 157-58, 870 P.2d at 119-20.
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However, the court also held that statutory provisions authorizing
warrantless arrests must be considered in pari materia with Article II,
Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, which requires that warrants
be reasonable. 9
In its opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court asserted its responsibility
as "the prime interpreters of [the New Mexico] constitution."'1° The
court acknowledged the Watson court's statement that statutory authority
gives a presumption of reasonableness, 0 1 but added that the presumption
of reasonableness may be rebutted by the court's interpretation of what

is constitutional. 102
The court also cited its recent decisions in which the search and seizure
provision of the New Mexico Constitution granted more protection than
the Fourth Amendment. 0 3 Following this precedent, the court declined
to adopt the blanket federal rule in Watson regarding warrantless arrests,
stating that in New Mexico the definition of what is reasonable depends
upon factual context. 1' 4 By asserting its own constitutional authority, the
New Mexico Supreme Court was able to reject the reasoning of the
majority in Watson and instead apply the reasoning of Justice Marshall,
who believed that it is the responsibility of the Supreme Court "to grapple
with the warrant requirement [of the search and seizures provision of
the Constitution] and the cases construing it. ' 'I0 5
After examining the facts of cases in which warrantless public arrests
were valid, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that for warrantless
arrests to be valid in New Mexico, an officer must justify his failure to
obtain a warrant with a showing of exigent circumstances.'06 Consequently,
after Campos, a warrantless search or arrest, whether in a public or a
private place, is reasonable only if there are both probable cause and
exigent circumstances.
V.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

By requiring exigent circumstances and probable cause for both public
and private warrantless arrests, the New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted
the search and seizure provision of the New Mexico Constitution in
accordance with the Warrant Preference rule.' 0 7 Consistent with its recent
decisions involving search and seizure, 10 the Campos court has now

99. Id. at 158, 870 P.2d at 120.
100. Id.
101. 423 U.S. at 416.
102. Campos, 117 N.M. at 158, 870 P.2d at 120.
103. Id. at 158, 870 P.2d at 120 (citing State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103 (1994);
State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993); State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784
P.2d 30 (1989)).
104. Campos, 117 N.M. at 158, 870 P.2d at 120.
105. Watson, 423 U.S. at 443 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Campos, 117 N.M at 159, 870 P.2d at 121.
107. See Maclin, supra note 13, at 204.
108. See supra notes 51-78 and accompanying text.
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provided a higher and more objective standard of "reasonableness" for
valid warrantless arrests in New Mexico than exists under federal law.
The high standard both clarifies the law in New Mexico and reinforces
the guarantee of the search and seizure provision of the New Mexico
Constitution as a first-class right.' °9 As the Campos court noted, "[o]ur
constitution preserves 'the fundamental notion that every person in this
state is entitled to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions."' 110
The court's decision in Campos has reinforced the constitutional mandate.
The confusion in other jurisdictions-over how to determine whether
a warrantless arrest is made in public or in private, and thus whether
exigent circumstances are required-underscores the importance of this
decision."' When what constitutes a "reasonable or legitimate expectation
of privacy" varies from case to case, the phrase ceases to have meaning.
By holding that exigent circumstances in addition to probable cause are
required for valid warrantless public arrests, the issue of whether a
warrantless arrest is made in a public or a private place is now moot
in New Mexico. In New Mexico, the right to be free from warrantless
arrests does not depend on where a person is standing. A person in her
home, in her doorway, or on the street has the same reasonable expectation
of privacy and thus the same protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
This decision will doubtless be controversial with those involved in law
enforcement, who will probably agree with Justice Powell that "a constitutional rule permitting felony arrests only with a warrant or in exigent
circumstances could severely hamper effective law enforcement.""' 2 Nevertheless, the concern that the police should be able arrest people in
public based only on probable cause, should not outweigh the right of
people to be free from unreasonable arrests.
In the future, the legal debate will probably focus on what constitutes
an exigency. On this issue the Campos court provides some guidance.
The court stated that the fact that Campos was driving an automobile
was not a sufficient exigency for a warrantless arrest." 3 By so stating,
the court has, perhaps, forestalled future confusion over the role cars
play in creating exigencies.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Campos interpreted Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution to require the existence of both probable cause and exigent
circumstances for warrantless public arrests. With this ruling, the New
Mexico Supreme Court continued a brave trend it began in Cordova,
analyzing the guarantees of the New Mexico Constitution independently

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Campos, 117 N.M. at 159, 870 P.2d at 121.
Id. (citing Gutierrez, 116 N.M. at 444, 863 P.2d at 1065).
See supra notes 18-50 and accompanying text.
Watson, 423 U.S. at 431 (Powell, J.,concurring).
Campos, 117 N.M. at 160, 870 P.2d at 122.
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from federal law when federal law appears to favor efficiency over
freedom. At a time when fear of crime has become the prime concern
of many Americans, it would have been easy for the supreme court to
expand the ability of the police to intrude into the affairs of private
individuals by construing the New Mexico Constitution liberally. Such a
construction, however, would not resolve the crime rate in New Mexico,
but only violate the constitutional right that everyone be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Campos decision should be praised
for providing clear guidance as to the standards necessary for a reasonable
warrantless arrest in New Mexico and abandoning the distinction between
private and public places.
WENDY F. JONES

